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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

CaseNo.980317-CA

BRIAN STARKE Y,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from convictions for assault by a prisoner, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1995), interference with arresting officer, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995), and threat against
life or property, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107 (1995).
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Was there sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for assault
by a prisoner where two police officers testified that defendant head-butted one of them in
the shoulder while they were booking defendant into jail?
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Issue 2: Was there sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for making
a threat against life or property where defendant admitted and several police officers testified
that defendant told an officer that he was going to "put a hit" out on the officer?
Standard of Review: A defendant who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence must
"marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate how this
evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient to support the verdict."
State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994). An appellate court will reverse a
conviction for insufficient evidence "only when the evidence is so inconclusive or so
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime." Id. (citations omitted).
Issue 3: Should this Court reach defendant's multiple claims of "judicial error" and
"prosecutorial overreaching" where he did not timely object to the alleged errors below and
where he has supplied no legal analysis in support of his argument?
Standard of Review: Absent plain error, an appellate court will not review issues
raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Olsen. 860 P.2d 332, 333 (Utah 1993); State v.
Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 654 n.3 (Utah App. 1997). It is well-settled that "an appellate
court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief." State
v. Thomas. 974 P.2d 269, 272 (Utah 1999); see also Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305,
313 (Utah 1998); Utah R. App. Proc. 24(a)(9) (1999).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following controlling statues and rules are contained in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1998);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107 (1995);
Utah R. Evid. 404(b);
Utah R. App. Proc. 24(a)(9).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Brian Starkey was charged in a February 1998 information with assault by
a prisoner and damaging a jail, both third degree felonies, and with two counts of
interference with arresting officer, five counts of threat against life or property, and one count
of false information to law enforcement officer, all class B misdemeanors (R.04-02). At the
preliminary hearing, the State voluntarily dismissed all but three counts: 1) assault by a
prisoner, 2) interference with arresting officer, and 3) threat against life or property
(R. 179:34-33). The trial court bound defendant over on the three remaining counts (R.39;
R. 179:59). The State subsequentlyfiledan amended information reflecting only those three
charges (R.40-41).
A jury convicted defendant of all three charges (R.93-92). Defendant moved to arrest
judgment and for a new trial (R. 124-120; 137-40). The trial court denied both motions,
ruling only that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict (R. 182:7; 182:9).
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The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of zero-to-five years for the
assault by a prisoner conviction and two jail terms of six months for the interference with
arresting officer and threat against life or property convictions (R.126, 154-52). The
sentences were to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to any other
prison sentences that defendant was then serving (R. 154-52).
Defendant timely appealed his convictions (R.163).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
After a short stand-off with police, defendant threatened to "put a hit" out on a
sheriffs deputy assisting in the arrest and then head-butted another deputy booking him into
jail. The following details are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. State
v. Gordon. 913 P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1996).
The stand-off
On February 25, 1998, Iron County Sheriffs Deputy Brett Allred assembled a team
of five officers to execute a no-bail arrest warrant on defendant for attempted aggravated
assault (R.181:13-14, 36-37, 91-92). Maryann Neal, a friend of defendant's, had called
Deputy Allred earlier to tell him that defendant was at a certain residence in Enoch
(R. 181:67,144-46). Deputy Allred had unsuccessfully tried to apprehend defendant the night
before (R. 181:60).
The officers arrived at the residence soon after 5:00 p.m. (R. 181:38-39,93).
Concerned that defendant might flee, the officers positioned themselves strategically around
4

the house (R. 181:14,37-38). Deputy Allred hid in a neighbor's back yard behind some old
parked cars (R. 181:3 8,39,93). Deputy Brown parked his marked police cruiser out of sight
(R.181:93). Trooper Dunlap watched the roads outside the subdivision to protect the
community and to stop defendant from fleeing in a vehicle (R. 181:31,37). Deputy Edwards,
who lived less than a block away, surveyed the residence through binoculars from the
windows of his home (R. 181:37,108-10).
Deputy Schlosser, who did not know defendant, knocked on the front door (R. 181:1415, 39). Schlosser asked the young man who answered the door if defendant was there
(R. 181:15). The young man turned to look at defendant who had just stood up (R. 181:15).
Schlosser asked defendant his name and whether Brian Starkey was there (R. 181:15).
Defendant told the officer that his name was "Doug" and that Brian had gone to Maryann's
house (R. 181:15-16).
Defendant and a woman in the home told Schlosser that he could look around
(R. 181:16-17). Defendant ran out the back door when Schlosser went into another room
(R.181:16-17).
Deputy Allred stepped out from behind his hiding place and intercepted defendant
(R. 181:39). Allred ordered defendant to the ground (R. 181:39). Defendant responded by
immediately putting his hand in his waistband and bringing his other arm, which was draped
by a coat, forward (R. 181:39-40). Allred drew his weapon and commanded defendant to
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show his hands and to go to the ground (R.l81:39-40). Instead of obeying, defendant
replied, "Shoot me. Just fiickin' shoot me" (R.l81:39-40).
By this time, Deputies Brown and Schlosser had rounded the corner of the home
(R. 181:18,40, 94). Brown and Schlosser also drew their weapons and with Allred formed
a semi-circle around defendant (R. 181:19, 41, 43, 94-95). All the officers repeatedly
ordered defendant to show his hands and to go to the ground (R. 181:19,21,40-41,111,155).
Defendant refused, backed away from the officers, and said, "It's not worth going back.
You're going to have to kill me" (R. 181:20-21, 41,43-44, 95).
Meanwhile, Trooper Dunlap and Deputy Edwards, who was armed with a shotgun,
arrived (R. 181:43,110-11). Edwards aimed his weapon at defendant and ordered him to put
his gun down (R. 181:111). Defendant asked Allred to tell Edwards to put the shotgun down,
but Allred refused and again commanded defendant to drop his weapon and get on the
ground (R. 181:112).
Deputy Allred eventually convinced defendant to surrender by promising that they
would not tackle him in the muddyfield(R. 181:20-21,41 -43,95-96). The officers allowed
defendant to move to a nearby sidewalk and kneel down (R. 181:42-43, 96). Allred cuffed
defendant's hands behind his back and then searched him for weapons (R. 181:45-46).
Defendant had no weapons, but he admitted at trial that he had purposely placed his hand in
his waistband to deceive the officers into believing that he had a gun (R. 181:46).
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The threat
After being cuffed, defendant began threatening and verbally abusing the officers
(R. 181:21-22,47,96). He was particularly belligerent towards Deputy Edwards who by this
time had put his shot gun away (R. 181:46,48,113). As the officers were leading defendant
to a police car, defendant warned Edwards, "I'm going to put a hit out on you just like your
brother" (R. 181:113, 22-23,49). When Edwards did not immediately respond, defendant
went nose-to-nose with Edwards and said, "You're not going to make it through the night.
You won't make it through the night. I'll see to it" (R.181:l 14, 49).
Deputy Edwards took the threat seriously because he had known defendant four years
and knew that he had "a large number of friends" (R.181:112-13,116). Edwards also knew
that defendant had "spent a significant time in jail" where he had likely made friends
(R. 181:113). Edwards was also struck by the "fire" in defendant's eyes when he made the
threat (R. 181:113). Edwards was so upset after the incident that he refused to leave his wife
and children at home alone that night to attend a previously planned banquet (R. 181:115-16).
The assault
While in the booking area of the jail, Deputies Allred and Brown had defendant stand
against the wall while they completed paperwork (R.181:52-53, 99, 101). The deputies'
backs were to defendant, whose hands were still cuffed behind him (R. 181:53, 55, 70,98).
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Defendant began pacing back and forth and threatening "to get" the officers9 jobs
(R. 181:52-53). Defendant also threatened Alfred's dog and family (R. 181:98-99). Deputy
Allred asked defendant two or three times to stand over against the door (R. 181:99, 52-53).
Defendant refused and continued to pace and verbally abuse the officers (R. 181:99,53,71).
Finally, Brown turned and ordered defendant to "stand over against that door and stay
there" (R. 181:99, 53). Defendant again reflised and told Brown to "[g]et out of my fucking
face" (R.181:99, 53).
The deputies decided to place defendant in a holding cell while they completed their
paperwork (R. 181:54). Allred reached out to grab defendant's right arm while Brown tried
to grab defendant's left arm (R. 181:54,99). As Allred touched defendant's arm, defendant
lunged forward and head-butted Allred in the shoulder (R.181:54-57, 73, 100, 102). As
Allred pushed defendant up against the wall, defendant continued to try to hit Allred with his
elbow or shoulder (R. 181:56-57). Because defendant continued to actively resist, the two
deputies took him to the ground (R. 181:58, 100).
Two corrections officers then entered the room and helped Allred and Brown force
defendant into a holding cell (R. 181:58,100-01). After removing defendant's boots from his
kicking feet, the correction officers left him in the locked cell (R.181:58).
Additional relevant facts are included in the argument section.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his assault by a
prisoner and threat against life or property convictions. This Court should decline to address
these challenges because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the
verdict and show how that evidence is legally and factually insufficient. In any event, when
properly marshaled, the evidence before the jury was clearly sufficient to support both
convictions.
In his last point, defendant cursorily raises four claims of "judicial error" and
"prosecutorial overreaching." Defendant has waived all those claims because he did not
timely raise any of them below. Moreover, his brief does not comply with the requirements of rule 24(a)(9) in that he cites to little legal authority for his claims and engages in no .
meaningful legal analysis. In addition, defendant has failed to show how any of the alleged
errors adversely affected the outcome of his trial.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR ASSAULT BY A
PRISONER WHERE TWO POLICE OFFICERS
TESTIFIED THAT DEFENDANT HEAD-BUTTED ONE
OF THEM IN THE SHOULDER WHILE THEY WERE
BOOKING DEFENDANT INTO JAIL
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for
assault by a prisoner. Specifically, defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to
show that defendant intended to cause bodily injury. Brief of Appellant [hereinafter "Br.
Aplt."] at 9-11. To support this claim, defendant asserts that defendant did not hit Deputy
Allred very hard with his head and that no one else, including Deputy Brown, actually saw
defendant's head hit Alfred's shoulder. Br. Aplt. 9-12.
To prevail on a claim of insufficient evidence, a defendant must marshal all the
evidence that supports the jury's verdict and then show how this marshaled evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is legally insufficient to support the verdict.
State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-08 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 819
(Utah App. 1994). Even then, a verdict will be reversed for insufficient evidence "only when
the evidence is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." Strain. 885 P.2d at
819 (citations omitted).
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Defendant has not met his marshaling burden. Instead, he has merely argued selected
portions of the evidence which he believes supports his position. This Court should therefore
reject defendant's claim. See Pilling, 875 P.2d at 608 (reflising to entertain merits of
insufficiency of the evidence claim where defendant failed to marshal evidence). In any
event, when properly marshaled, the evidence supports defendant's conviction.
To convict defendant of assault by a prisoner, the State had to prove that defendant
was in custody and that he committed assault intending to cause bodily injury. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1995).1 An assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes or creates
a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1995). The jury was instructed only under subsections (a) and
(b).
Defendant does not dispute that he was in custody and therefore a prisoner. Thus, the
only question is whether there was evidence to show that defendant, intending to cause
bodily injury (a) attempted, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to Deputy
Allred or (b) made a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence to do

*Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 provides: "Any prisoner who commits assault,
intending to cause bodily injury is guilty of a felony of the third degree." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-101 (1995) defines "prisoner" as "any person who is in custody of a peace
officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined in a jail or other penal institution."
11

bodily injury to Deputy Allred. Bodily injury means "physical pain, illness, or any
impairment of physical condition." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(3) (1995).
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he intended to
cause bodily injury to Deputy Allred or that he head-butted Deputy Allred. Br. Aplt. 8-11.
To support this contention, defendant points to testimony suggesting that he did not hit
Allred very hard, that Brown did not see him make contact with Allred, and that no one else
saw the defendant trying to head-butt Allred. Br. Aplt. 8-11. The following marshaled
evidence, however, shows that the State presented ample evidence from which the jury could
reasonably infer that defendant not only committed assault by head-butting Allred in the
shoulder, but also that he intended to cause bodily injury in doing so:
1. Deputy Allred testified that as he and Deputy Brown attempted to place
defendant in a holding cell, defendant head-butted Allred in the shoulder
(R. 181:54-55, 70). With the help of the prosecutor, Allred physically
demonstrated how defendant heat-butted him (R.l 81:55-56, 73).
2. Allred testified that defendant's head struck him in the shoulder with some
force (R.l81:56, 72-73). Although defendant struck Allred in the shoulder,
Allred testified that he believed that defendant was aiming for his head
(R.l81:56). Allred also testified that if defendant had been successful in
striking his head, Allred would have likely sustained some bruising (R. 181:8687). "
3. Allred testified that after the head butt, defendant continued to try to hit him
with his elbow or shoulder (R. 181:56).
4. Deputy Brown testified that he saw defendant try to head-butt Allred
(R. 181:99, 104-05). Brown also stated that defendant made "a deliberate
lunge forward" (R.l81:100). Brown testified that he thought defendant's
lunge forward was an attempt to hurt one of the officers (R. 181:106).
12

5. Deputy Brown testified that just before the scuffle, defendant acted
belligerently and, while pacing back and forth, threatened Allred, saying that
Allred and his family were not safe and that Alfred's dog was "history"
(R. 181:98). According to Brown, defendant continued to threaten the officers
even after they took him to the ground (R. 181:100).
6. Deputy Allred testified that defendant was still kicking his feet while corrections
officers tried to remove his boots in the holding cell (R. 181:58).
The jury could reasonably conclude from the foregoing testimony that defendant
head-butted Allred in the shoulder and that he did so with the intent to cause Allred bodily
injury or physical pain. Defendant's belligerence and threats both before and after the assault
evidenced an intent to hurt Deputy Allred. Defendant's deliberate and forceful lunge toward
Allred also demonstrated an attempt to physically harm the deputy. Defendant's continuing
efforts to hit Allred with his elbow or shoulder after the head butt provided further evidence
that defendant intended to cause Allred bodily injury.
It is irrelevant that defendant was unsuccessful in harming Deputy Allred. Allred and
Brown expressly testified that they both saw and felt defendant deliberately lunge forward
to head-butt Allred. Under the assault statute, it was enough that defendant attempted to
cause bodily injury; the State did not have to prove that he actually caused bodily injury.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(a). It also does not matter that no one other than Allred and
Brown saw the head butt or its attempt. Their testimony alone, which was evidently believed
by the jury, was sufficient to establish that defendant deliberately head-butted Deputy Allred.
See Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425, 44 n.6 (Utah 1998) (explaining that jury may choose
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which witnesses to believe and may base verdict on testimony of one witness even when
there are nine contradictory witnesses).
In sum, as shown by the foregoing, defendant did not marshal the evidence. In any
event, the evidence was clearly sufficient to support the conviction for assault by a prisoner.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR THREAT AGAINST
LIFE OR PROPERTY WHERE DEFENDANT
ADMITTED THAT HE THREATENED TO PUT A "HIT"
ON A POLICE OFFICER AND THERE WAS EVIDENCE
TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT INTENDED THE
THREAT TO CAUSE THE OFFICER TO BE FEARFUL
Defendant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction
for threat against life or property. Br. Aplt. 12-15. Specifically, he claims that the threat was
no more than "idle talk" made in a fit of "transitory anger" and that there was no evidence
that he intended the threat to place anyone in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Br.
Aplt. 12-15.
The Court should refuse to address the merits of this claim because defendant again
fails to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's verdict and show how that evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict. Pilling. 875 P.2d at 608; Strain. 885 P.2d at 819; see
discussion on marshaling requirement supra at 10-11. When marshaled, the evidence was
plainly sufficient to support a conviction for threat against life or property.
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To convict defendant of making a threat against life or property, the State had to prove
that (1) defendant threatened to commit any offense involving violence and (2) the threat was
made with the intent to place a person in fear of serious bodily injury. Utah Code Ann. § 765-107 (1995).2 The statute does not require an intent to carry out the threat or that the
recipient of the threat actually be placed in fear. See State v. Fixel 945 P.2d 149,151 (Utah
App. 1991) (holding Utah's analogous "threatening a judge" statute does not require that
defendant intend to carry out threat); see also State v. Rodriguez, 569 N. W.2d 686,695 (Neb.
Ct. App. 1997) (similarly worded terroristic threat statute does not require intent to execute
threats or that victim be terrorized); Svkes v. State, 578 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Minn. Ct. App.)
(effect of terroristic threat not essential element of offense), cert, denied by Svkes v.
Minnesota, 119 S.Ct. 619 (1998); Commonwealth v. Tizer, 684 A.2d 597, 600 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1996) (neither ability to carry out threat nor a belief by victims that it will be carried out

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107 states in full:
(1) A person commits a threat against life or property if he threatens to
commit any offense involving violence with intent to:
(a) cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency
organized to deal with emergencies;
(b) place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or
(c) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building or room; place of
assembly; place to which the public has access; or aircraft,
automobile, or other form of transportation.
(2) A threat against life or property is a class B misdemeanor, except if the
actor's intent is to prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building, a place
to which the public has access, or a facility of public transportation operated
by a common carrier, the offense is a third degree felony.
Defendant was charged only under subsection (l)(b). (R. 40, 101).
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essential element of crime). Rather, the statute only requires that a threat to commit a violent
crime be uttered with the intent to cause the recipient to fear imminent serious bodily injury.'
See FixeK 945 P.2d at 151 (analogous "threatening a judge" statute requires only that threat
be uttered and that defendant have intent specified in statute); see also Cook v. State. 940
S.W.2d 344, 347 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (interpreting almost identically worded statute to
require only making of threat with intent to place victim in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury); Commonwealth v. Ferrer, 423 A.2d 423, 424 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (interpreting
similar terroristic threat statute to require only making of threat with intent to terrorize
victim); State v. Carlson. 559 N.W.2d 802, 807 (N.D. 1997) (same).
Defendant does not dispute that he uttered a threat of violence when he told Deputy
Edwards, "Fm going to put a hit out on you just like your brother." He argues only that the
evidence was insufficient to show that he intended to place Edwards in fear of serious bodily
injury. Br. Aplt. 12-15. To support this claim, defendant asserts that his threat was uttered
on the "spur of the moment" during a heated argument and was the result of mere "transitory
anger." Br. Aplt. 12-13. Defendant then cites to decisions from Pennsylvania for the
proposition that "spur-of-the-moment" threats resulting from "transitory anger" are excluded
from criminality. See Commonwealth v. Ferrer. 423 A.2d 423 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980);
Commonwealth v. Kidd. 442 A.2d 826 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
Defendant's reliance on Pennsylvania authority is misplaced. First, the official
comment to the Pennsylvania terroristic threat statute specifically excludes "mere spur-of16

the-moment threats which result from anger." Official Comment, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706
(1999); see also Commonwealth v. Hudgens, 582 A.2d 1352, 1358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
In contrast, nothing in the plain language of Utah's statute excludes coverage of threats
made in anger or on the spur of the moment. Rather, the statute plainly prohibits any threat
of violence made with the intent to place the recipient in fear of serious bodily injury.
Second, both Ferrer and Kidd, as well as other Pennsylvania decisions, make clear that
evidence showing that a threat of violence was made with the intent to terrorize is sufficient
to sustain a conviction even though the threat was arguably made in a fit of anger. Ferrer,
423 A.2d at 424, 425 (nature of threat and surrounding circumstances of defendant's
shouting at detective that his testimony would cost him one of his kids was sufficient to
establish settled purpose to terrorize); Kidd, 442 A.2d at 827 (record insufficient to show
defendant intended to place officers in state of fear where hand-cuffed defendant generally
screamed and shouted at officers and threatened to kill them with a machine gun); Tizer, 684
A.2d at 599-601 (defendant's threats to kill his brother during heated five minute
confrontation were not spur-of-the-moment threats, but fell within purview of terroristic
threat statute); Hudgens. 582 A.2d at 1355,1358 (defendant's threats "to get" victim during
heated argument followed by drawing of sword was not spur-of-the-moment threat because
victim was subjected to impairment of personal security targeted by statute). The focus of
those decisions, like the focus of Utah's statute, is whether a threat of violence was uttered
with an intent to terrorize or place the victim in fear. Once proof of those two elements are
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met, it is irrelevant that the threat may have been made in "transitory" anger. See Carlson,
559 N.W.2d at 807-08 (holding that critical inquiry under Nebraska terroristic threat statute
is whether defendant intended to place others in fear for their safety and that a defendant's
"transitory anger" is relevant only in that limited context).
More important, the record here does not support defendant's claim that his threat was
mere "idle talk" and only the product of "transitory anger" without any specific intent behind
it. Indeed, the following evidence and reasonable inferences, ignored by defendant, show
that defendant did intend to place Deputy Edwards in fear of imminent serious bodily harm:
1. Although defendant made a number of general threats to the other officers
at the scene, Deputy Allred testified that he was particularly belligerent
towards Edwards (R.181:46-47).
2. Defendant's threat to put out a "hit" or "contract" specifically targeted
Edwards and even mentioned Edwards' brother (R. 181:23, 49, 113). Unlike
the other generalized threats defendant made to the other officers, the threat
against Edwards specified the means by which defendant would harm Edwards
(R.181:22-23,47,49,96).
3. Edwards testified that when he did not immediately respond to the threat,
defendant got nose-to-nose with Edwards and stated, "You're not going to
make it through the night. You won't make it through the night. I'll see to it"
(R. 181:114). Deputy Allred verified that at one point defendant was almost
touching noses with Edwards (R. 181:48).
4. Edwards testified that he took the threat seriously because he had known
defendant for four years and knew that he had a large number of friends and
that defendant had spent a significant amount of time in jail, enabling him to
make friends there (R.181:l 12-13, 116).
5. Edwards testified that defendant had a "fire" in his eyes when he made the
threat (R. 181:113).
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6. Edwards finally testified that he was so upset after the incident that he
refused to leave his wife and children home alone that night even though he
had previously planned to attend a banquet (R. 181:115-16).3
Intent is rarely proved by direct evidence, but must be inferred from all the evidence.
FixeL 945 P.2d at 152 n.4. Here, the jury reasonably could have inferred from the foregoing
evidence that defendant uttered his threat intending to place Deputy Edwards in fear of his
life. He did not make a similar threat to the other officers (R. 181:22-23,47,49,96). When
Edwards did not immediately respond to this specific threat, defendant put more force behind
it by getting into Edwards' face and threatening him again (R. 181:113-14).
Also, the jury could have concluded that defendant's threat was a credible one as
evidenced by Edwards' testimony that defendant had many friends, some with criminal
records (R. 181:112-13, 116). Finally, Edwards' reaction of refusing to leave his wife and
children at home alone that night provided further evidence that defendant not only intended,
but succeeded in placing Edwards in fear of his physical safety.

3

In his brief, defendant states that Edwards responded to his threat with a single
word, "whatever," thereby suggesting that Edwards did not take the threat seriously. Br.
Aplt. 6. While it is true that Deputy Allred testified that this was Edwards' response
(R. 181:49), defendant's brief ignores all the other testimony that Edwards did take the
threat seriously (R. 181:112-16). As stated, in reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence
claim, all the evidence is viewed together in the light most favorable to the verdict. See
Pilling. 875 P.2d at 607-08.
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In short, defendant has failed his marshaling burden by ignoring evidence that
supports the verdict. When properly viewed, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's
conclusion that defendant intended his threat to place Edwards in fear of his personal safety.
POINT HI
DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HIS CLAIMS OF
"JUDICIAL ERROR" AND "PROSECUTORIAL
OVERREACHING"
Defendant cursorily raises four issues in his last point: 1) that although the trial court
sustained his objection to testimony that defendant had tried to hit Deputy Allred on a prior
occasion, the court erred in not "striking" that testimony (Br. Aplt. 17-20); 2) that the trial
court made prejudicial comments in front of the jury (Br. Aplt. 21-23); 3) that the prosecutor
improperly asked defendant for details regarding a prior felony conviction under rule 609(a),
Utah Rules of Evidence (Br. Aplt. 20-21); and 4) that the prosecutor improperly used his
rebuttal testimony to merely rehash the State's case-in-chief (Br. Aplt. 21).
Defendant has waived all of these claims because he did not timely raise them below.
Defendant also has not adequately briefed any of these issues. The Court should therefore
refuse to address them.
A. Defendant waived his claim that the trial court erred in not striking testimony.
Background. The prosecutor asked Deputy Allred on direct examination how long
he had known defendant (R.181:35). Allred replied that he had known defendant
approximately four years and that all his contacts with defendant had been within the context'
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of his job as a police officer (id.). The prosecutor then asked Allred to describe his first
encounter with defendant (id.). The deputy testified that defendant's mother had called him
to come to her home to explain the laws regarding dogs at large to defendant because his dog
had just killed some ducks (id). Allred stated that while he was explaining the law to
defendant, defendant tried to hit him (id.). Defendant immediately objected to the testimony
as irrelevant and moved to strike (id.).
After listening to the State's response, the trial court sustained the objection and the
prosecutor continued his direct examination of Allred (R. 181:35). Although the trial court
did not specifically rule on defendant's motion to strike, defendant did not at any time bring
this to the court's attention (R. 181:35).
Defendant complains for thefirsttime on appeal that although the trial court sustained
his objection, it did not formally strike the testimony that he tried to hit Allred. Br. Aplt. 1920. He asserts that the jury likely convicted defendant based on this unanswered allegation.
Br. Aplt. 19-20.
Waiver. "As a general rule it is the objecting party's obligation to obtain a ruling on
the objection or such objection is waived on appeal." State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959,961 (Utah
App. 1989) (citations omitted); see also Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549,552 n.2
(Utah 1984) (court refused to reach issue appellant first raised in post-trial memorandum
where no indication that trial court reached or ruled on issue); Brobergv.Hess. 782 P.2d 198,
201 (Utah App. 1989) (appellate court will not undertake to consider issue absent indication
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in record that trial court reached or ruled on an issue). The purpose of this rule is to put "the
judge on notice of the asserted error and allow[] the opportunity for correction at that time
in the course of the proceeding." Broberg, 782 P.2d at 201.
Here, the trial court sustained defendant's objection of irrelevance to the testimony,
but in what appears to be an oversight, did not specifically rule on defendant's motion to
strike (R. 181:35). It behooved defendant at that time to ask the court to rule on his motion
to strike. Ortiz, 782 P.2d at 961. At the very least, defendant could have broached the issue
at any time during the trial and asked the court to specifically inform the jury that the
testimony was stricken and should not be considered by them. This would have allowed the
judge to timely correct any perceived error instead of leaving defendant with a hidden issue
for appeal. Under the circumstances, defendant has waived this issue.
Inadequate briefing. Even if defendant had properly preserved his claim, he has not
adequately briefed it. Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an
appellant to include in his brief "the contentions and reasons . . . with respect to the issues
presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."
This Court has repeatedly refused to consider arguments which, in contravention of this rule,
are not adequately briefed. See, e.g.. State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992);
State v. Day. 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991).
Citing only to rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, and a single case, State v.
Doporto. 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997), defendant merely asserts that Deputy Allred's testimony
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that defendant had tried to hit him on a prior occasion was inadmissible and that it's
admission unfairly prejudiced him. Br. Aplt. 17-20. Defendant makes no mention of the
applicable standard of review and the fact that Doporto was overruled by a 1998 amendment
to rule 404(b).4 See State v. Decorso. No. 960512, slip op. at 4-11 (Utah June 4, 1999).
Defendant also fails to engage in any meaningful analysis of why Alfred's statement
was inadmissible under rule 404(b). A reviewing court is "entitled to have the issues clearly
defined with pertinent authority cited." State v. Thomas, 974 P.2d 269, 272 (Utah 1999)
(citations omitted); see also Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1024 (Utah 1996). An
appellate court is not "simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the

4

After Doporto, rule 404(b) was amended to read:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
is not admissible to pro\e the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identify, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence
offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character
purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
(Amendment in italics). The advisory committee notes state that the Utah Supreme
Court, by emergency rule, effective February 11, 1998, amended the rule to "abandonf]
the additional requirements for admitting evidence under Rule 404(b) imposed by State v.
Doporto. 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997)." The notes further explain that the amendment was
intended to return to the traditional application of Rule 404 prior to Doporto. See State v.
Decorso. No. 960512, slip op. at 4-11 (Utah June 4, 1999) (affirming the purpose of the
amendment was to overrule the rule 404(b) analysis adopted by Doporto and explaining
the appropriate standard of review and analysis under that rule.
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burden of argument and research." Thomas, 974 P.2d at 272 (citations omitted). Because
defendant has not adequately briefed this issue, this Court should decline to address it.5
B. Defendant waived his claim that the trial court made prejudicial comments before
the jury.
Background. On direct examination, the prosecutor attempted to question Deputy
Allred about threats that defendant had allegedly made against Allred's police service dog
(R. 181:33-34). Defendant successfully objected to this line of questioning as it did not relate
to any of the charges before the jury (R. 181:34). In cross-examining Allred, however,
*Even if defendant had preserved and adequately briefed this issue, he has not
shown how the trial court's failure to formally "strike" Allred's statement adversely
affected the outcome for him. State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 126 (Utah App. 1987)
(court will not reverse conviction unless error is harmful, i.e., that absent error there is
reasonable likelihood of more favorable outcome to defendant). Although the court did
not use the word "stricken," sustaining an objection on the ground of irrelevancy would
have informed the jury that the statement was not relevant to the case and therefore
should not be considered by them.
Moreover, the jury heard without objection so much other evidence of defendant's
prior misconduct that it is unlikely that Deputy Allred's single allegation had any real
impact on the jury's verdict. For example, the jury heard that officers were trying to
serve a no-bail arrest warrant on defendant for attempted aggravated assault (R. 181:64,
81-82, 91-92); that Deputies Allred and Edwards had known defendant for years, all
within the context of their employment as police officers (R.181:88-89, 113); and that,
according to defendant, Edwards had arrested him on another charge two years previously
and later insinuated to defendant's former girlfriend that defendant was a drug dealer (R.
181:152-53). Defendant tried to use this evidence to show that the officers were biased
against him (R. 181:60, 63, 65-66, 152-53, 155). Given this other testimony, the jury was
bound to infer that defendant had a history of being in trouble with the law and of
attempted aggravated assault even if Allred had not made the complained-of statement.
In short, given that defendant's objection was sustained and that Allred's statement
was not particularly inflammatory within the context of all the testimony, it is unlikely
that the court's failure to formally "strike" that statement had any appreciable impact on
the outcome of trial.
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defendant began to explore charges dismissed at the preliminary hearing (R. 181:65). After
Allred denied telling defendant that he was going to charge defendant with every charge he
could think of, defendant questioned Allred about the probable cause statement that
supported the original information which charged defendant with twelve criminal counts (R.
181:65). Specifically, defendant questioned defendant about the damage to a jail charge
which had been dismissed at the preliminary hearing:
Q [by defense counsel]: Now, you indicate on this [probable cause] statement
that uAfter Mr. Starkey was in a holding cell, he continued to make threats
towards myself, family and job. Then he started to damage the holding cell."
A: Correct.
Q: And based upon that probable cause statement, Mr. Starkey was originally
charged with a felony offense of damage to a jail cell; is that correct?
[Prosecutor]: Objection, your Honor. I don't see any relevance of charges that
are not even present today. That we're not even dealing with. We're wasting
the jury's time.
[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, it clearly goes to motive. This officer has
testified that he didn't make statements to the effect that, "I'm going to charge
you with everything I can." Yet he swears out a probable cause —
The Court: I will allow — you've opened the door. We'll go back into
everything that was dismissed at preliminary hearing. If they have any
incriminating evidence, they could put that on, and that counts. Do you want
to try it on that charge as well? We won't add a count, but if they have
anything that they could counter your exploring this area with, they can go into
that. It won't be irrelevant. Go ahead.
(R. 181:65-66). Defendant then went on to establish that he had not damaged the jail, but
that another inmate had (R. 181:66-67).
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Defendant complains on appeal that the trial court's comments in overruling the
State's objection improperly informed the jury that damaging a jail was not the only charge
dismissed at the preliminary hearing. Br. Aplt. 23. Defendant asserts that this suggested that
the State may have other incriminating evidence, thereby "interject[ing] the same type of
prejudice that attends the introduction of all types of "prior bad acts" evidence." Br. Aplt.
23.
Waiver Defendant has waived this claim because he did not timely raise this issue
below. Defendant let the court's comment pass with no request for relief at any time during
the trial. Defendant first raised this issue in his motion for a new trial (R181:65-66;R.138).
The trial court, however, did not reach the merits of this issue, but simply ruled that themotion for a new trial was denied because there was sufficient evidence to support the
verdict (R.159; R. 181:5, 9). This was not sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. See
Estate of Covington v. Josephson. 888 P.2d 675, 678 n.5 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that
issue raised for first time in post-trial motion is not preserved for appeal where trial court
merely denies post-trial motion without holding evidentiary hearing or addressing merits of
issue); Cunningham, 690 P.2d at 552 n.2 (refusing to reach issue first raised in post-trial
memorandum where no indication that trial court reached or ruled on issue); cf State v.
Belgard. 830 P.2d 264, 265-66 (Utah 1992) (issues raised and dealt with in post-trial
evidentiary hearings are preserved for appeal); State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053
(Utah 1991) (same). This Court should therefore decline to address this issue.
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Inadequate briefing. Defendant has also inadequately briefed this issue. Defendant
cites to no legal authority and engages in no legal analysis in support of his claim that the
trial court's statements prejudiced him. Br. Aplt. 21-23. He merely asserts that the trial
court's "allusion to other crimes which the defendant had been previously charged with and
of which the prosecutor may have other 'incriminating evidence' had the natural tendency
to interject the same type of prejudice that attends the introduction of all types of'prior bad
acts' evidence." Br. Aplt. 23. In view of defendant's failure to cite to any legal authority or
to develop his argument, this Court should decline to review this issue. State v. Yates, 834
P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991).6
C. Defendant waived his claim of a rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, violation.
Background. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant if he had any
prior felony convictions (R.181:163). Defendant responded that he had one prior felony

6

In any event, defendant has also failed to demonstrate how the court's comment
prejudiced him. There was nothing inherently prejudicial in the trial court's comment,
within the context it was given. The court merely pointed out to defendant that by
addressing counts dismissed in the preliminary hearing, he was opening the door for the
State to counter with any incriminating evidence it might have with respect to those
charges (R. 181:65-66). The jury had already been alerted by defendant that he had been
charged with other counts (R. 181:64). Indeed, a primary theme of the defense was that
Deputy Allred had grossly and unfairly overcharged defendant, thereby proving that
Allred had an axe to grind with defendant (R.181:64-65, 152-53, 162). Also, the jury
heard all of defendant's conduct with respect to the final three charges, thereby making it
irrelevant that he might have been charged with other matters. Under these
circumstances, it is difficult to fathom how the court's statement, even if improper, could
have prejudiced defendant.
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conviction for witness tampering (R. 181:163). Without objection, the prosecutor inquired
into the details of the conviction (R. 181:163). In response, defendant explained that he had
"flipped off and thrown a trash bag at a witness in a proceeding against defendant's exgirlfriend (R. 181:163).
For thefirsttime on appeal, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly inquired
into the factual basis for the prior conviction. Br. Aplt. 20-21.
Waiver. As explained, an appellant may not raise an issue for thefirsttime on appeal.
See State v. Nelson. 725 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986) (absent any indication that this issue
was raised at trial, it cannot be considered for first time on appeal).7 Defendant did not
object to the prosecutor's questioning about the prior conviction or ask for any kind of relief
below. This Court should therefore refuse to address the merits of defendant's claim.8
D. The State did not present improper rebuttal.
In a three-sentence paragraph, with no cites to the record, defendant asserts that the
State improperly used rebuttal testimony to do nothing more than allow Deputy Allred to tell

7

An issue not raised below may be reviewed under the plain error doctrine. State
v. Olsen. 860 P.2d 332, 333 (Utah 1993); State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 654 n.3
(Utah App. 1997). Defendant, however, has not argued plain error. See State v.
Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah 1992) (court will not consider issue raised for first
time on appeal when appellant did not argue plain error).
8

As with the other claims, even if defendant had preserved the issue he has not
shown prejudice. Defendant's explanation of the witness tampering charge actually
minimized his conduct and made it sound much less serious than the crime of witness
tampering.
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his side to the jury one more time. This Court should refuse to address the merits of this
claim because defendant never objected below to the State's rebuttal testimony (R. 181:18690), and because he has not adequately briefed the issue on appeal. Moreover, defendant
mischaracterizes the State's rebuttal case. Only Deputy Allred testified on rebuttal
(R. 181:186-90). His testimony was short and confined to responding only to matters raised
by defendant (id.). The Court should therefore reject this claim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant's
convictions.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not request
that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue.
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ADDENDUM A
Statutes and Rules

76-5-102.5. Assault by prisoner.
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily injury, is guilty
of a felony of the third degree.

76-5-102. Assault.
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes or
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes substantial bodily
injury to another.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily
injury to another.

76-5-101. "Prisoner" defined.
For purposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who is in custody of
a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined in a jail or other
penal institution or a facility used for confinement of delinquent juveniles
operated by the Division of Youth Corrections regardless of whether the
confinement is legal.

76-5-107. Threat against life or property — Penalty.
(1) A person commits a threat against life or property if he threatens to
- commit any offense involving violence with intent to:
(a) cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency
organized to deal with emergencies;
(b) place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or
(c) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building or room; place of
assembly; place to which the public has access; or aircraft, automobile, or
other form of transportation.
(2) A threat against life or property is a class B misdemeanor, except if the
actor's intent is to prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building, a place to
which the public has access, or a facility of public transportation operated by
a common carrier, the offense is a third degree felony.

76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and
interferes with the arrest or detention by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful
order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the
first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided
in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this
rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the
requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is admitted unless it was in issue.
Subdivision (b) is comparable to Rule 55.
the federal rule, verbatim [but see notes below
regarding the 1998 amendment]. Provisions of Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).-State v.
this rule apply to character evidence to prove Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982). See Boyce,
conduct, as distinguished from proof of charac- Evidence of Other Crimes or Wrongdoing, 5
ter where character is an essential element of a Utah Bar J. 31(1977).
charge, claim or defense. As to the latter, see
This amendment [the 1998 amendment, efRule 405(b). See also Advisory Committee Note fective February 11, 1998] abandons the addito Rule 404, Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule tional requirements for admttting evidence un47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was compa- der Rule 404(b) imposed by State v. Doporto,
rable. See also State v. Day, 572 P.2d 703 (Utah 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). It clarifies that
1977) (character evidence as to the character of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, ofthe victim of a homicide was admissible to fered under 404(b), is admissible if it is relevant
rebut the defendant's contention that the de- for a non-character purpose and meets the
ceased was the aggressor). One significant dif- requirement of Rules 402 and 403.
ference between this rule and Rule 47, Utah
Utah's existing Rule 404 is otherwise identiRules of Evidence (1971) is that there is no cal to Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 404 and
provision for the use of character evidence in the equivalent rule in most other states. This
civil cases, except where character is the ulti- amendment to the rule is not intended to demate issue in question, whereas Rule 47 autho- part from the meaning and interpretation given
rized the use of character evidence in civil cases to the equivalent rule in other jurisdictions, but
not only on the ultimate issue but where other- to return to the traditional application of Rule
wise substantively relevant. See Boyce, Char- 404 prior to Doporto.
acter Evidence: TTie Substantive Use, 4 Utah
Amendment Notes. — The Supreme Court
Bar J. 13,18-19 (1976). However, Rule 48, Utah of Utah, by emergency rule, effective February
Rules of Evidence (1971) expressly excluded 11,1998, amended this rule by adding the last
character evidence with respect to a trait as to sentence to Subdivision (b). See the Advisory
care or skill. The Advisory Committee to the Committe Note above explaining the amendFederal Rules of Evidence concluded that the ment.
remaining justification for the admission of
Compiler's Notes. — Rule 404. as amended,
character evidence was so insignificant that was approved by the Supreme Court of Utah as
character evidence in civil cases should not be an emergency rule effective February 11, 1998.

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page
references.!
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to
the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue:
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial
court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in
the trial court.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11)
of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this
rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made
in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under
which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the
brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The
addendum shall contain a copy of:
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.

